It has been shown (Hart [2002] ) that the backward induction (or subgame-perfect) equilibrium of a perfect information game is the unique stable outcome for dynamic models consisting of selection and mutation, when the mutation rate is low and the populations are large, under the assumption that the expected number of mutations per generation is bounded away from zero.
Introduction
Conventional game theory relies on the assumption that players are rational. However, in evolutionary models there is no assumption of rationality, and the behavior driving the process by which agents adjust their strategies may be entirely mechanistic. Therefore, it seems surprising that both lead to "rational" stability, i.e., to equilibrium behavior.
The "rational" outcome of evolutionary models is due to a combination of the two main ingredients of evolution: selection, which is a process whereby better strategies prevail, and mutation, which is relatively rare and generates random strategies.
The consideration of evolutionary dynamics naturally gives rise to the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), introduced by Maynard Smith and Price [1973] . An ESS is a Nash equilibrium in which any small change by mutation will be eliminated by the process of selection. Therefore, an ESS is "stable" with regard to both selection and mutation.
This Paper
In this paper we follow the work of Hart [2002] . We study the long-run behavior of evolutionary dynamics, we introduce a few notions of stability, and finally, we show the stability properties of the backward induction equilibrium.
As in Hart [2002] , the games we consider are finite games in extensive form with perfect information. In these games, an equilibrium point can always be obtained by "backward induction." The result is also an equilibrium in each subgame, whether that subgame is reached or not. Such a point is called a subgame-perfect equilibrium, or a backward induction equilibrium.
For each game, there is an associated population game; i.e., at each node there is a distinct population of individuals who play the game in the role of the corresponding player. For each population, the proportions of different strategies in the population may be viewed as a mixed strategy.
The dynamic process is a Markov chain on the space of the mixed strategies of the various populations. The model is as follows. At each period, one individual is chosen at random in each population. His current strategy may then change by selection, mutation, or it may not change at all. Selection replaces his strategy by another strategy which, against the other populations currently playing the game (i.e., "against the field"), yields a higher payoff. Mutation replaces his strategy by an arbitrary strategy, chosen at random.
Finally, all the choices at each node are made independently. Such dynamics yield an irreducible and aperiodic system whose long run behavior is well described by the corresponding unique invariant distribution, which for each state gives the frequency of that state's occurrence during any large time interval.
As in the case of ESS, we are looking for stable strategies in this model, which are able to withstand the pressure of mutation. Therefore, a strategy profile (i.e., a mixed strategy in each population) is stable if the frequency of its occurrence in the long run depends on selection and not on mutation.
When the populations are fixed, a strategy profile is evolutionarily stable if its occurrence is positive independently of the mutation rate, i.e., if its invariant probability is bounded away from zero as the mutation rate goes to zero. When the populations increase, the invariant distribution may change.
Therefore, we define a strategy profile to be evolutionarily stable for large populations (ESLP) if its invariant probability is bounded away from zero as the mutation rate goes to zero and the populations increase to infinity. In Hart [2002] it is shown that when the populations are fixed, the backward induction equilibrium is evolutionarily stable. Moreover, it is shown that the backward induction equilibrium becomes in the limit the only stable outcome as the mutation rate decreases to zero and the populations increase to infinity, provided that the expected number of mutations per generation is bounded away from zero.
1 Therefore, only the backward induction equilibrium may be ESLP.
In this paper we show that this additional proviso (on the expected number of mutations per generation) is not needed.
2 Thus, the backward induction equilibrium must be ESLP, and we have the stronger result:
1 I.e., the populations go to infinity at least as fast as the mutation rate goes to zero. 2 The class of dynamics considered here is less general than Hart [2002] : we assume that the probability for selection is bounded away from zero. See Remark 3 in Subsection 2.3.
Main Result: The backward induction equilibrium is the unique outcome that is evolutionarily stable for large populations; i.e., it is in the limit the only stable outcome as the mutation rate decreases to zero and the populations increase to infinity.
The following section presents the model. Section 3 defines stability and presents the Main Theorem as well as some preliminaries results. Section 4 proves the Main Theorem, using a few general propositions on Markov chains. Section 5 concludes with possible extensions of our result.
The Model
The model is as in Hart [2002] , except for a somewhat less general class of dynamics. 
The Game
Let Γ be a finite extensive-form game with perfect information. We are thus given a rooted tree; each non-terminal vertex corresponds to a move. It may be a chance move, with fixed positive probabilities for its outgoing branches; or it may be a move of one of the players, in which case the vertex is called a node. The set of nodes is denoted N . It is convenient to view the game in "agent-normal form": at each node there is a different agent, and a player consists of a number of agents with identical payoff functions. For each node i ∈ N , the agent there -called "agent i" -has a set of choices A i , which is the set of outgoing branches at i. We refer to a i in A i as a strategy of i, and we put A := i∈N A i for the set of N -tuples of strategies. At each terminal vertex (or leaf ) there are associated payoffs to all agents; let u i : A → R be the resulting payoff function of agent i (i.e., for each a = (a j ) j∈N ∈ A: if there are no chance moves, then u i (a) is the payoff of i at the leaf that is reached when every agent j ∈ N chooses a j ; if there are chance moves, it is the appropriate expectation). As usual, the payoff functions are extended multilinearly to randomized (or mixed ) strategies; thus u i : X → R, where
, the unit simplex on A i , is the set of probability distributions over A i .
For each node i ∈ N , let N (i) be the set of nodes that are successors (not necessarily immediate) of i in the tree, and let Γ(i) be the subgame starting at the node i.
An N -tuple of randomized strategies x = (x i ) i∈N ∈ X is a Nash equilibrium
It is moreover a subgame-perfect (or backward induction) equilibrium of Γ if it is a Nash equilibrium in each subgame Γ(i), for all i ∈ N . Such an equilibrium is therefore obtained by backward induction, starting from the final nodes (those nodes i with no successors, i.e., with N (i) = φ) and going towards the root. We will denote by EQ and BI the set of Nash equilibria and the set of backward induction equilibria, respectively, of the game Γ; thus BI ⊆ EQ ⊆ X. The classical result of Kuhn [1953] states that there always exists a pure backward induction equilibrium. We assume here that the game Γ has a unique backward induction equilibrium, which must therefore be pure; we denote it b = (b i ) i∈N ∈ A, and refer to b i as the "backward induction strategy of i." This uniqueness is true generically, i.e., for almost every game. For instance, when there are no chance moves, it suffices for each player to have different payoffs at different leaves.
The Gene-Normal Form
We now consider a population game associated to Γ: at each node i ∈ N there is a nonempty finite population M (i) of individuals playing the game in the role of agent i. We assume that the populations at different nodes are
e., all individuals in M (i) except q(i) do not change their strategies.
• Choose one of SE(i) ("selection"), M U (i) ("mutation") and N C(i) ("no change"), with probability σ, µ and 1 − µ − σ, respectively.
• If selection SE(i) was chosen, then define
is the set of "better strategies" -those strategies at node i that are strictly better in Γ, against the populations at the other nodes, than the strategy ω • If mutation M U (i) was chosen, thenω i q(i) is a random strategy in A i ;
i.e.,ω i q(i) := a i with probability 1/ |A i | for each a i ∈ A i .
• If no-change N C(i) was chosen, then the strategy of q(i) does not change:
In general, there is no need for the various probabilities to be equal, just comparable. Therefore the general model is as follows. We are given a mutation rate parameter µ > 0, and a population size m such that |M (i)| = m for all nodes i ∈ N . The process is a stationary Markov chain on Ω m = Ω(Γ, (M (i)) i∈N ), whose one-step transition probability Q = (q ω,ω ) ω,ω∈Ωm satisfies:
• For each i ∈ N , one individual q(i) ∈ M (i) is chosen, such that there exist constants γ 1 ,γ 2 > 0 with
, and (2.5)
• There exists a constant σ > 0 such that, for each i ∈ N ,
where
is the set of strictly better strategies, as defined in (2.3).
• There exist constants α 1 ,α 2 > 0 such that, for each i ∈ N ,
Without loss of generality, all parameters α 1 ,α 2 ,γ 1 ,γ 2 ,σ are taken to be the same for all i ∈ N . It can easily be seen that the basic model is a special case of the general model, where γ 1 = γ 2 = 1, α 1 = 1/ max i∈N |A i | and
Remarks:
1. For simplicity we assume that |M (i)| = m for all nodes i ∈ N , but the same proof (up to minor changes) will work even if we assume only that the populations are comparable; i.e., the ratios |M (i)| / |M (j)| for all nodes i, j ∈ N are bounded away from zero.
2. As in Hart [2002] , we assume that the mutation rate µ is fixed, but we only need the mutation rates in the different populations to be comparable.
3. We assume that the probability of switching to a better strategy by selection is bounded away from zero -whether or not that strategy is currently present in the population. Therefore, our class of dynamics is less general than that of Hart [2002] (where the above probability may be proportional to the current proportion of the strategy in the
4. A general model with a one-step transition matrix Q satisfying (2.4) -(2.9) yields a Markov chain which is irreducible, since the probability of reaching any state from any other state is positive (as follows from (2.5) and (2.8), by using an appropriate sequence of mutations). Hence there exists a unique invariant distribution π on Ω m . The Markov chain is moreover aperiodic, since there is positive probability of staying in the same state. Therefore the long-run behavior of the process is well described by π, in the following two senses:
• In any long enough period of time, the relative frequency of visits at a state ω is approximately π[ω]; i.e., for every ω ∈ Ω m :
• The probability that the state ω occurs at a period t is approxi-mately π[ω] for large t; i.e., for every ω ∈ Ω m :
The two properties hold regardless of the initial state; moreover, they hold not only for single states ω but also for any set of states Ω ⊆ Ω m .
Stability
In this section we define stability and present the main result of this work.
Definitions
We are interested in the behavior of the process when the mutation rate is low, i.e., in the limit of the invariant distribution π as µ → 0. We will look at the case where the population size m is fixed, and at the case where m → ∞.
Let the game Γ and the constants α 1 , α 2 , γ 1 , γ 2 and σ be fixed. For every mutation rate µ > 0 and population sizes m, let Θ(m, µ) be the set of all one-step transition matrices Q = (q ω,ω ) ω,ω∈Ωm satisfying (2.4) -(2.9) with mutation rate µ and population sizes m. For every Q ∈ Θ(m, µ), let π Q be the unique invariant distribution of Q, and let
Recall that each state ω ∈ Ω m may be viewed as an N -tuple of mixed strategies
on Ω m therefore induces a probability distributionπ
We now consider the case where the populations increase, i.e., m → ∞ (while the game and constants remain fixed). As m → ∞, the state space changes and becomes infinite in the limit; we need therefore to consider the probabilities of neighborhoods rather than the probability of a single point.
For every > 0 and N -tuple of mixed strategies x ∈ X, let x be the -neighborhood of x, i.e., x := {y ∈ X : x − y < } (we will also use BI instead of b ). We will also use ESLP to denote the set of all N -tuples which are ESLP.
Thus, x is ESLP if, for any neighborhood of x, the relative frequency of visits at that neighborhood is bounded away from zero, for all large population sizes and all small mutation rates.
Remarks:
1. When the populations are fixed, equilibria other than the backward induction equilibrium b may be evolutionarily stable (for example, equilibrium c in the game 6 Γ 1 of Figure 1 ; see also Remark 2 in Subsection 3.1 of Hart [2002] ). Therefore, the backward induction equilibrium is not the only equilibrium which is "m-evolutionarily stable for all m;" but as seen in Hart [2002] , the probabilities of all other equilibria go to zero as m → ∞. e −mµ , which goes to zero as mµ → ∞.
The Main Result
In Hart [2002] it is shown that the backward induction equilibrium is mevolutionarily stable for all m, and that only the backward induction equilibrium may be evolutionarily stable for large populations, i.e., ESLP ⊆ BI.
Here we show that the backward induction equilibrium is always ESLP. Moreover, any neighborhood of the backward induction occurs in the limit with probability 1. Thus, in the long run, as the mutation rate is low and the populations are large, the dynamic system is most of the time in states where almost every individual plays his backward induction strategy; i.e., for all ρ > 0, when µ < µ 0 ≡ µ 0 ( , ρ) and m > m 0 ≡ m 0 ( , ρ), at least 1 − ρ of the time, the proportion of individuals at all nodes who do not play their backward induction strategy is < , for all dynamics Q ∈ Θ(m, µ).
The backward induction equilibrium is m-evolutionarily stable for all m, and therefore any neighborhood of it is also m-evolutionarily stable. Moreover, from the double limit (3.1) it follows that the iterative limit lim m lim µ is 1 -and thus positive, which implies that BI is m-evolutionarily stable uniformly in m. Therefore, any neighborhood of backward induction equilibrium is uniformly evolutionarily stable, i.e., the probability, as µ → 0, to be in BI is bounded away from zero for all m (and goes to 1 as m → ∞).
Preliminary Results
For each m, let ES m be the set of all m-evolutionarily stable N -tuples of mixed strategies.
The following result describes the relations between the different sets of equilibria.
Proposition 3.6. ESLP ⊆ BI ⊆ ES m ⊆ EQ, and each one of the last two inclusions may be strict. 2 )) is one-mutation-reachable (see the proof of Theorem 3.1.
of Hart [2002] ) from 9 x; i.e., b can be reached from x by one mutation step in node 2 (from c 2 to b 2 ) followed by selection steps in the two nodes. Therefore, there is a constant C = C(m) > 0, such that the probability of leaving x and reaching b before returning to x is at least cµ (as m is fixed and for all µ > 0).
In order to reach x from b, we must have two consecutive moves by mutation in any of the nodes (either a mutation from b 1 to c 1 or a mutation from b 2 to c 2 ) while there is selection in both nodes towards b. Therefore, the mean first entrance time from b to x, denoted u b,x , is of the order of 10 (σ/mµ)
The mean recurrence time of x satisfies u x ≥ Cµ · u b,x 1/µ. The invariant probability of x is 11 1/u x µ, and therefore x is a Nash equilibrium which is not m-evolutionarily stable.
12
9 To streamline the argument, we are ignoring the distinction between a state ω and its corresponding pair of mixed strategies x = x(ω) (given by (2.2)).
10 Note that m is fixed and therefore m 1. 11 See (7.4) of Feller [1950] . 12 See also Subsection 2.3 of Nöldeke and Samuelson [1993] . There it is shown (Proposition 1) that if a component of states is not one-mutation-reachable from any other component, but is one mutation away from some other component, then that component is not in the support of the limiting distribution.
The Outcome of the Dynamics
In this section we prove a few general propositions on Markov chains, and we use these propositions to describe the long-run behavior of our dynamics, and to prove the Main Theorem.
An Outline of the Proof
We begin by providing an outline of the proof. By Theorem 3.2 of Hart [2002] , in order to show (3.1), it is enough to assume that mµ ≤ D for some
The proof is based on the following two properties of our dynamic system, regardless of what specific matrix Q ∈ Θ m,µ we choose:
P1 The expected time to reach BI is at most C 1 (m + 1/µ) for some constant C 1 .
P2
The expected time to leave BI is at least C 2 m/µ for some constant
By P1 and P2, over time, the Markov chain looks like this:
BI BI
Time Therefore (Proposition 4.4), on average, the system will be in BI a proportion of at least If < λ, the proportion of b i for each state in BI will decrease only by mutation, and if we start in BI /2 ⊆ BI we will need ≥ m /2 mutations. The expected time of each mutation is 1/µ; therefore, the expected time to leave BI (starting from BI /2 , we use P1 with /2) is at least C 2 m/µ (Proposition 4.8).
In order to show P1, we need the following proposition (Proposition 4.3):
Let Ω be a finite state space, which can be partitioned into K +1 different subspaces Ω 0 , . . . , Ω K . Our aim is to calculate the expected time it takes to get to Ω 0 , starting from Ω K (denote that average by U ). Let u k , for k = 1, . . . , K, be the expected time it takes to go from Ω k to Ω k−1 . Then it is easy to see that U ≤ u K + · · · + u 1 . Now assume that we have the one-step probabilities. Assume that for every k = 1, . . . , K, there is a probability of f k of going (in one step) "forward"
from Ω k to Ω k−1 , and there is also a probability of g k of going "back" from Ω k to Ω K (and a probability of (1 − f k − g k ) of staying in Ω k ). If g k = 0 for all k, then the expected time to go from Ω k to Ω k−1 is 1/f k , and we get
If g k ≥ 0 (for the case K = 2, see Figure 3 ), the expected time to go from Ω K to Ω K−1 is 1/f K . However, in Ω K−1 , for each "successful" move to Ω K−2 , there are, on average, g K−1 /f K−1 moves back to Ω K . Therefore, the expected time to go from
Adding for all k and rearranging yield
Figure 3: The State Space for K = 2
The proof of P1 is by backward induction. Let us show it in the game Γ 1 of Figure 1 with the basic dynamics, for node i = 2.
Let Ω be the set of states with x 3 (b 3 ) ≥ 1 − (for some < 1/10, which is an appropriate λ for this game). A move at 3 from b 3 to c 3 can only occur by mutation; therefore the proportion of b 3 will stay above 1− with probability greater than 13,14 (1 − µ).
Assume by induction that it takes O(m + 1/µ) periods to reach Ω . Let U be the expected time until both
we have U ≤ O(m + 1/µ) + U 1 + U 2 , where U 1 is the expected time until node 2 becomes a reached node 15 (while in Ω and not leaving it) and U 2 is the expected time until x 2 (b 2 ) ≥ 1 − (while in Ω and node 2 is reached).
Step 1: We compute U 1 (Proposition 4.5).
Divide Ω into two sets: in Ω 1 put all the states where all the population at 1 plays b 1 (and therefore node 2 is not a reached node), and in Ω 0 put all the states where node 2 is a reached node. There is a probability of at least µ of going from Ω 1 to Ω 0 (a mutation at node 1 from b 1 to c 1 ), and the probability of going back -outside of Ω , i.e., the probability that the 13 We are ignoring all the constants. 14 This is also true when |N (i)| > 1. 15 A node i is a reached node in state ω, if in all the nodes between i and the root, at least one individual plays the strategy towards node i.
proportion of b 3 will decrease below 1 − -is only µ. Using (4.1) we have
Step 2: We compute U 2 (Proposition 4.6).
Node 2 will remain a reached node, unless there is only one individual in node 1 who plays c 1 , and that individual is chosen (with probability 1/m).
Therefore the node will remain a reached node with probability (1 − 1/m). If the proportion of c 2 is greater than , then the probability of choosing such an individual is ≥ , and the probability that the individual will change his strategy to b 2 by selection is ≥ σ. Therefore, the probability that the proportion of c 2 will decrease is ≥ σ.
A move from b 2 to c 2 can be done only by mutation. Therefore the probability that the proportion of c 2 will increase is ≤ µ.
Using (4.1), we have (we assume that mµ ≤ D)
Therefore, U ≤ O(m + 1/µ), and by induction we have P1.
General Propositions
Let Ω be a finite state space with a transition matrix Q = (q ω,ω ) ω,ω ∈Ω . For each Ω ⊆ Ω and ω ∈ Ω, let {X t } ∞ t=0 be a Markov chain on Ω with initial state ω. Define T (ω, Ω ) = min{t ≥ 0 | X t ∈ Ω }; i.e., T (ω, Ω ) is the number of periods it takes to get to Ω starting from ω. 
Proof. Let ω 0 ∈ Ω 0 such that U (ω 0 , Ω 2 ) = U (Ω 0 , Ω 2 ), and let {X t } ∞ t=0 be a Markov chain on Ω with initial state ω 0 . Define T 1 = T (ω 0 , Ω 2 ) and
Proposition 4.2. Let {f n } ∞ n=1 and {g n } ∞ n=1 be two real sequences such that f n > 0 and g n ≥ 0 for all n. Let {a n } ∞ n=0 satisfy a 0 = 0 and for all n > 0,
Then for all n > 0,
Proof. We will use induction on n. For n = 1 we have a 1 ≤ 1/f 1 + (1 + e 1 /f 1 )a 0 = 1/f 1 . Assume that
Let Ω be a state space with a transition matrix Q. For all ω ∈ Ω and A ⊆ Ω, let Q(ω, A) = ω ∈A q ω,ω -the probability of going from ω to A in one step. 
For every 1 ≤ k ≤ l ≤ K we will prove by induction on s = l, l − 1, . . . , k A s ) . Therefore, using Proposition 4.1,
∈ A k and we have
After rearrangement we have
, and
Therefore, by Proposition 4.2,
Remark 4.1. In Proposition 4.3 it is sufficient to assume that Proposition 4.4. Let a finite state space Ω and a transition matrix Q be an irreducible and aperiodic Markov chain with an invariant distribution π. Let Ω 1 ⊆ Ω 2 ⊆ Ω and let C 1 and C 2 be constants which satisfy:
∈ Ω N . Let T 0 = T 0 (X) = 0 and define successively for n ≥ 1:
For every t ≥ 1 define:
Then for every t
now be a Markov chain on Ω with some initial distribution (q ω ) ω∈Ω , and define as above T n , H t , P t and Q t for all n ≥ 0, t ≥ 1. Note
As in the proof of Proposition 4.1, for every n ≥ 1, we have
The Proof of the Main Theorem
We now use the previous propositions to prove the Main Theorem. Let the game Γ be fixed. We start with a number of useful notations.
• For each node i ∈ N , let
. This is the proportion of population i that does not play the backward induction strategy in state ω.
• Given two nodes i, j ∈ N such that i is a descendant of j (i.e., i ∈ N (j)), let R j,i (ω) be an indicator random variable, defined as 1 if node i is reached from node j in state ω, and 0 otherwise; i.e., R j,i (ω) = 1 if and only if for every node k ∈ N on the path from j to i there is at least one individual q ∈ M (k) whose choice ω k q is the strategy that leads toward i. Let a k,i ∈ A k be that strategy. When j is the root we will write R i (ω)
for the indicator that i is reached.
• For each node i ∈ N , when every j ∈ N (i) plays the backward induction strategy -i.e., when Y j (ω) = 0 -the unique local best reply for i is b i (recall that b is the unique backward induction equilibrium). Therefore there exists a λ i > 0 (appropriately small) such that b i is the unique local best reply of i when Y j (ω) < λ i for all j ∈ N . Let λ = min i∈N λ i .
This λ depends on the game only, and will be fixed from now on.
• Let L i (ω) be an indicator random variable, defined as 1 if Y j (ω) < λ for all j ∈ N (i), and 0 otherwise. Thus, when L i (ω) = 1 the backward induction strategy b i is the unique local best reply of i.
• Assume that the nodes are numbered {1, . . . , n}, where
for all i ∈ N , and G n+1 ( ) = Ω. Note that if < λ, then for every
Therefore, L j 1 (ω) = 1 for all j 1 ≥ i.
•
For every mutation rate µ > 0 and population size m, let Q ∈ Θ(m, µ). For every ω ∈ Ω m letω be the next state, i.e., for all ω ∈ Ω m ,
We use the notations above to state the following implications of the dynamics given by (2.4) -(2.9):
1. All strategies have a positive probability of being chosen by mutation:
2. If node i is not reached, i.e., R i (ω) = 0, then all strategies of i yield the same payoff and only mutation affects ω i . Therefore:
is the global best reply of i and thus certainly a "better strategy" for a "non-
, and there isn't any "better strategy" for a
4. Using (4.3) and (4.6) we get
5. If R i (ω) = 1, then for all the nodes j ∈ N on the path from the root to node i, there must exist q ∈ M (j) such that w j q = a j,i (recall that a j,i is the strategy in node j which leads toward node i). To get R i (ω) = 0, there must be some node j on the path where no one plays a j,i , which means that the only individual who played a j,i must have been chosen. Therefore (by (2.5)):
Therefore (by (4.7)):
From now on, > 0, m > 2nγ 2 , µ < 1/(2α 2 ) and Q ∈ Θ(m, µ) are fixed.
Proof. Without loss of generality assume that the nodes along the path from the root to node i are 1, 2, . . . , i.
i.e., H k is the set of all states in G j ( ) such that node i is reached from node k + 1, but in node k no one chooses the strategy towards node k + 1. Let
If node i is not reached, then there is a node where no one chooses the strategy towards node i, and there is a unique maximum node like that. Therefore
for all k ≤ l < i. To getω ∈ H l for some k < l < i there must be R l,l+1 (ω) = 0, which can happen only by mutation (by (4.3)). By (4.9) we get
Therefore there is a constant g k (which depends on the game and not on m or µ) such that
(4.10)
To getω ∈ H l for some 0 ≤ l < k, it is enough that all the following will happen:
•ω ∈ G j ( ), and by (4.9) we get
• R l ,l +1 (ω) = 1 for all k < l < i, and by (4.3) we get
• R k,k+1 (ω) = 1, which happens if q(k) choose by mutation the strategy towards node i, and by (4.2) we get
As each of those things depends on different nodes, we get (using (2.4)) that there is a constant f k > 0 such that (1 + g k µ f k µ )
Proposition 4.6. If λ > , then there is a constant C 1,2 = C 1,2 (Γ, ) such that U (Ω m , G i ( )) ≤ C 1,2 · (U (Ω m , G i+1,i ( )) + m)e C 1,2 mµ for all i ∈ N .
Proof. Without loss of generality assume that m is an integer. Let i ∈ N . Note that by the assumption on the numbering of the nodes, for every node j ∈ N (i) we have j > i. Therefore N (i) ⊆ {i + 1, . . . , n}. Proof. Without loss of generality assume that < λ. For 17 mµ ≤ D and Q ∈ Θ(m, µ), there is, by Corollary 4.7, a constant C 1 such that U (Ω m , G 1 ( /2)) ≤ C 1 (m + 1/µ), and by Proposition 4.8, there is a constant C 2 > 0 such that for every ω ∈ G 1 ( /2), we have U (ω, Ω m G 1 ( )) > C 2 (m/µ). Let π Q be the invariant distribution of Q; then, by Proposition 4.4,
Therefore,π 
Extensions
We now present some related questions.
1. As seen in Remark 2 in Subsection 3.1, we must take a neighborhood of b in order to assure that the limit (3.1) exists and is positive, and therefore, as seen in Corollary 3.5, for every > 0, the iterative limit lim inf m lim inf µ is positive. However, we do not know whether we need to take a neighborhood of b in order to assure that the iterative limit is positive.
Thus, it is possible that the backward induction equilibrium is uniformly evolutionarily stable; i.e., the probability, as µ → 0, of reaching BI is bounded away from zero for all m.
2. In order to prove the Main Theorem, we assume that the probability of switching by selection to a better strategy is positive (see Remark 3 in Subsection 2.3). It seems that without this assumption, the limit (3.1) may well be strictly less than 1, but this does not necessarily imply that the backward induction equilibrium is not ESLP.
3. We assume in our proof that mµ ≤ D for some 0 < D < ∞. This assumption is needed in order to show, using Proposition 4.6, that
i.e., if node i is a reached node, and in all nodes j > i most of the individuals play their backward induction strategy, then after m periods, most of the individuals in node i will play their backward induction strategy.
It seems possible that the inequality
( /2)) + m + 1/µ) can be proven without any assumption on mµ; i.e., if we start from a state in which at all the nodes j > i the proportion of individuals who do not play the backward induction strategy is small enough (no more than /2), then the expected time to reach G i ( ) is bounded. In this case, one obtains a unified proof of the Main Theorem and the two cases (mµ ≤ D here and mµ ≥ δ in Hart [2002] ) need not be considered separately.
